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There is growing concern among social scientists, policymakers, and the general public about unequal political influence and its consequences for economic inequality in the United
States (Jacobs and Skocpol 2005; Bartels 2008; Kelly 2009; Hacker and Pierson 2010; Flavin 2012; Gilens 2012; Kelly and Witko 2012; Ellis 2013) . One common explanation for why affluent citizens tend to be more successful at getting their preferences translated into policy is that they possess the resources to hire highly paid and well connected professional lobbyists to advocate for their interests. In contrast, disadvantaged citizens do not enjoy the same level of representation (in terms of both quantity and quality) among professional lobbyists in Washington and statehouses across the nation, and correspondingly exert less influence over the policy decisions made by elected officials. In response to these perceived inequities, laws that regulate the registration and conduct of professional lobbyists are one attempt to lessen the influence of wealthy interests and ensure that citizens" opinions receive more equal consideration when elected officials make important policy decisions. 2 This question is difficult to answer at the federal level because one uniform set of laws regulates professional lobbyists in Washington and changes in those laws that occur over 1 There are, of course, other reasons for enacting lobbying regulations as well. Among the most cited are discouraging quid pro quo arrangements between lobbyists and legislators and guarding against the appearances of impropriety that might diminish citizens" trust in government (Rosenthal 2001; Newmark 2005) 2 As Robert Dahl (2006, ix) states, "The existence of political equality is a fundamental premise of democracy." In the context of political representation, "political equality refers to the extent to which citizens have an equal voice in governmental decisions. One of the bedrock principles in a democracy is the equal consideration of the preferences and interests of all citizens" (Verba 2003, 663). time are contemporaneously correlated with many other changes in the political system. By comparison, the fifty states vary dramatically in terms of how much, or little, they regulate the registration and conduct of professional lobbyists (Opheim 1991; Brinig, Holcombe, and Schwartzstein 1993; Newmark 2005; Ozymy 2013 ). For example, some states have few regulations on lobbying activities while other states have enacted strict requirements for lobbying disclosure as well as limits or outright bans on the gifts lobbyists can give to elected officials.
Despite the important implications for the quality of American democracy, no study to date has evaluated whether stricter lobbying regulations correspond to more egalitarian patterns of political representation. In this paper, I use the variation across the fifty American states to examine the relationship between lobbying regulations and the equality of political representation and uncover evidence that stricter regulations are associated with greater political equality. Specifically, states with more stringent lobbying regulations tend to exhibit a weaker relationship between income and political influence. These findings contribute to our understanding about the potential effects of lobbying regulations and ultimately underscore the important role that laws and institutional design can play in promoting greater political equality in the United States.
Background and Theoretical Expectations
Professional lobbyists, representing both for-profit and non-profit interests, are increasingly active in statehouses across the nation (Rosenthal 2001; Newmark 2005; Ozymy 2010 ). Regardless of the interests they represent, among the most valuable asset a lobbyist can provide to state legislators and their staffs is rigorously researched information about a particular policy area. Given the resource-constrained environment many state legislators operate within (Squire 2007) , this information can be of great value in helping them to decide which issues to prioritize and, ultimately, how to cast their vote on pending legislation. In an ideal world where all interests in society received equal representation and attention from lobbyists, they would play an indispensable role in ensuring public opinion gets accurately translated into public policy outputs. However, a range of studies have documented the high proportion of business and other for-profit interests among lobbyists, interest organizations, and political action committees (Schattschneider 1960; Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Thomas and Hrebenar 1990; Gray and Lowery 1996) . As Gray, Lowery, Fellowes, and McAtee (2004, 412) assert, "It is clear that the distribution of interests represented before government is not isomorphic with the distribution of interests in society."
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Perhaps because of the perceived inequities in political influence, there is a deep mistrust of lobbyists among the general public in the United States (Cigler and Loomis 2007) . Simply stated, many citizens feel that organized interests exert too much special influence over the policy decisions made by elected representatives (Nownes 2001) . To combat this concern among the general public, states have (to various degrees) attempted to regulate the conduct of lobbyists by mandating lobbyist registration, enacting financial disclosure laws and limits on honoraria and gifts (Rosenthal 2001; Newmark 2005) , and by creating independent ethics commissions to scrutinize the conduct of lobbyists and the legislators they attempt to influence (Rosenson 2003 (Rosenson , 2005 .
Despite the recent proliferation of these lobbying regulations in the states, there have been surprisingly few attempts to evaluate their substantive effects on state politics and 3 Or, as Schattschneider (1960, 34-35) famously quipped, "The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent." policymaking in general and on the equality (or lack thereof) of political influence in particular.
The small set of studies to date that examine the consequences of lobbying regulations in the states have tended to focus on their effects on the size (Hamm, Weber, and Anderson 1994; Lowery and Gray 1997) and composition/diversity (Lowery and Gray 1993; Gray and Lowery 1998) 
Evaluating the Equality of Political Representation in the States
Although political representation is central for American democracy, there is little consensus on how best to measure the concept. For years, political scientists have experimented with different ways of evaluating the link between the people and their government (Achen 1978) . One crucial distinction has been whether public opinion is compared to the behavior of individual elected officials (Miller and Stokes 1963; Achen 1978; Erikson 1978; Powell 1982; Bartels 1991; Clinton 2006) or to the content of public policies (Page and Shapiro 1983; Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993; Erikson, Mackuen, and Stimson 2002; Wlezien 2004 ). This paper focuses on the latter, policy representation, because government policy is the final link of the chain that begins with citizens" inputs (their political opinions and behaviors) into the political system. More importantly, regardless of how a citizen"s particular state house member or senator votes on any given bill in the state legislature, citizens are ultimately affected by the decisions of the legislature as a whole and the actual policies that are implemented.
Policy representation is measured using a proximity technique that places public opinion and policy on the same linear scale and compares the distance between the two (Achen 1978). 4 Using this method, as the ideological distance between a citizen"s opinion and policy grows (i.e. policy is ideologically "further" from a citizen"s preferences), that citizen is not well represented.
A substantively similar measurement technique has been used in several recent studies to evaluate the ideological distance between citizens and Member of Congress (Griffin and Flavin 2007; Newman 2007, 2008; Ellis 2012 Ellis , 2013 , Senators (Gershtenson and Plane 2007) , and presidential candidates (Burden 2004; Jessee 2009) estimates and inferences. One way to address this problem is to pool surveys over a long period of time (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993) . Another way is to simulate state opinion by using national polls and multi-level modeling to derive estimates for the states based on demographic characteristics (Park, Gelman, and Bafumi 2006; Lax and Phillips 2009a,b) . The major advantage of pooling these three NAES surveys is their sheer sample size which allows a large enough sample without having to aggregate across a long time period or simulate state opinion (Carsey and Harden 2010) . This large sample size is especially important because this paper later assesses the relationship between income and ideological proximity within individual states.
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Citizens" general political ideology is measured using the following item from the NAES:
"Generally speaking, would you describe your political views as very conservative, conservative, moderate, liberal, or very liberal?" The five point measure is coded such that it runs from -2 (very conservative) to +2 (very liberal). Data on citizens" self-reported political ideology have 5 A total of 177,043 NAES respondents across the three survey waves answered the ideological selfplacement and income items. All states except North Dakota (N=475) and Wyoming (N=414) have a sample size of over 500 respondents. Alaska and Hawaii were not surveyed, so all analyses in this paper report results from the remaining 48 states.
been commonly used to measure public opinion in previous studies of political representation (e.g., Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993; Griffin and Flavin 2007; Bartels 2008; Flavin 2012) and there is reason to be confident that self-reported ideology is an accurate measure of citizens" aggregated policy-specific opinions. For example, Table 1 of respondents who place themselves in the "very liberal" category support that policy proposal.
These differences across ideological classifications suggest that self-reported ideology is a reasonably accurate measure of citizens" operational policy opinions.
[ Table 1 Second, a recent article by Sorens, Muedini, and Ruger (2008) provides a rich source of data on state policies in twenty different areas ranging from public assistance spending to gun control to health insurance regulations. 8 In addition to specific statutes and spending data, the authors provide a summary index of policy liberalism for each state that they derive by factor analyzing their entire range of policies. This composite score is used as a second measure of general policy liberalism. 9 Together, the two policy liberalism measures represent the unidimensional liberal/conservative ideology of state policy decisions that correspond well to the measure of citizens" general political ideologies described above.
Evaluating ideological proximity requires a method of placing citizens" opinions and state policy on a common scale for comparison (see Figure 1) . Drawing on previous studies that also used the same proximity technique to measure political representation (Achen 1978; Burden 7 Gray, Lowery, Fellowes, and McAtee (2004) argue that using these policy items, as opposed to a measure of per capita expenditures for different policy areas, precludes the possibility that policy liberalism is simply a proxy for a state"s wealth. The five measures produce a Cronbach's alpha of .63. 8 The state policy data can be accessed online at www.statepolicyindex.com. 9 The Gray et al. (2004) and Sorens et al. (2008) First, all ideological opinions are standardized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one and the two recent measures of general state policy liberalism described above (Gray, et al. 2004; Sorens et al. 2008 ) are then standardized as well. After standardizing both opinion and policy, they are now on a common (standardized) metric, similar to the strategy used by Wright (1978) . Proximity is measured as the absolute value of the difference between a respondent"s ideology score and the policy liberalism score for his/her state using both of the measures of policy. This creates the first measure of ideological distance for each respondent in the NAES sample which is labeled the Standardized measure.
Second, the two measures of state policy are rescaled to the same scale (-2 to +2) as citizens" self-reported ideology. This technique is similar to that used in early studies of congressional representation (Miller 1964; Achen 1978) and one that is still advocated by representation scholars today (Burden 2004; Griffin and Newman 2008) . The absolute value of the distance between a respondent"s ideology score and the policy liberalism score for his/her state is again computed and labeled the Same Scale measure.
Third, policy is rescaled to a tighter range (-1 to +1) than citizens" ideologies. This procedure is used because we can expect citizens" ideological opinions to have a wider range and take on more extreme values compared to actual state policy outputs. This transformation to a tighter scale is suggested and implemented by Powell (1982 Powell ( , 1989 Simply put, we might expect someone making $100,000 per year living in West Virginia to exert comparatively greater political influence than someone making $100,000 per year living in Connecticut. To account for differences in the income distribution across states, I generate a measure of state relative income that compares a respondent"s income with the average income for a resident in his or her state. A positive score for state relative income indicates that a respondent is above the mean while a negative score indicates that a respondent is below the mean.
Armed with this measure of state relative income, I then assess whether there is a systematic relationship between citizens" incomes and the ideological distance between their opinion and state policy. To evaluate this relationship, I regress the measure of ideological distance on income for every respondent in the sample using the six different measures of ideological proximity described above. 11 The results of these six regression estimations are reported in Table 2 . Reading across the six columns reveals strong evidence of unequal political representation. Specifically, all six coefficients for income are negative and bounded below zero which indicates that as a respondent"s income increases, the distance between their ideology and state policy decreases and they are better represented. Put another away, the lower a respondent"s income, the greater the distance between opinion and policy and the worse that respondent"s general political ideology is represented in the general liberalism of his or her state"s public policies. Substantively, the larger opinion-policy distance for a respondent at the 10 th percentile for income compared to a respondent at the 90 th percentile is about the same as the difference between a respondent at the 10 th percentile for (state relative) level of education compared to the 90 th percentile (Gilens 2005) and larger than the difference between an African
American respondent compared to a white respondent (Griffin and Newman 2008) . These findings comport with the small but growing set of studies (Gilens, Lax, and Phillips 2011; 11 Because residents are clustered within states and experience the same state policy, I report standard errors that are adjusted for clustering by state for all regressions in Table 2 . The results in Table 2 are substantively similar if a random intercepts hierarchical linear model (with respondents nested within states) is used instead. Wright 2011, 2013; Flavin 2012 ) that have found that citizens with low incomes are systematically underrepresented in the policymaking process in the American states.
[ Table 2 about here]
As discussed above, the primary rationale for examining unequal political representation at the state level is to understand and explain variation in political equality across the states. To assess in which states political influence is strongly tied to income compared to those states that weigh opinions more equally, I run a separate regression for each state and compare the coefficient for (state relative) income. Similar to the nationwide regression reported in Table 2 , a more steeply negative slope coefficient indicates a stronger relationship between income and ideological distance and, accordingly, less political equality. For example, consider the two hypothetical states presented in Figure 2 . For each state, the line represents the slope of the relationship between income and ideological distance. As the figure illustrates, the relationship between income and distance is rather weak in State C, indicating that citizens" opinions are weighted roughly equally regardless of their income. In contrast, the slope of the relationship between income and ideological distance is quite steeply negative for State D, indicating that there is a strong degree of political inequality in state policymaking.
[ Figure 2 about here]
A separate regression is run for each state using each of the six different measures of ideological proximity described above (three measurement techniques x two measures of state policy liberalism). 12 The six regression coefficients (for state relative income) have a Cronbach's alpha of .96, indicating that all six measures appear to be measuring the same concept. To create a single summary score of political equality that is directly comparable across states, I conduct a principal components analysis on the six slope coefficients and generate a single factor score for each state. 13 Because a more steeply negative slope coefficient indicates more unequal representation (i.e. a stronger relationship between income and ideological distance), a more positive factor score indicates greater political equality (i.e. a more equal weighting of citizens" opinions). This new measure is labeled the "Political Equality Index."
[ Table 3 about here]
The factor scores generated using this procedure are reported in Table 3 where the states are ranked from the most to least equal in terms of political representation. It is important to note that the index is not simply an alternative measure of the liberalism of state policy (with the expectation that lower income citizens support more liberal policies). The Political Equality correlate perfectly (i.e. as income increases, so does ideological conservatism). If the state"s policy position is more conservative than all citizens" ideology positions, the regression coefficient for income would be negative (indicating that as income increases, ideological distance between opinion and policy decreases). But, if the state"s policy position is more liberal than all citizens" ideology positions, the coefficient for income would be positive (indicating that as income increases, ideological distance between opinion and policy also increases). Even though the distribution of citizens" opinions in the state is identical under both scenarios, the regression coefficients are very different depending on where state policy is located in the ideological space (relative to citizens" opinions). Therefore, the coefficient for respondents" income for single state regressions does not simply indicate the relationship between income and ideology within a state but instead indicates (as intended) the sign and strength of the relationship between income and opinion-policy distance. 13 The eigenvalue for the lone retained factor is 5.15 and explains 86% of the total variance.
Index correlates with the Gray et al. (2004) (with higher numbers indicating more regulations) that catalogues the number of different groups required to register as lobbyists, the frequency of reporting requirements, the types of activities that are prohibited, and disclosure requirements. Data is collected on a biennial basis from the In the analysis presented below, the Political Equality Index (described above) is regressed on the measure of the strictness of state lobbying regulations to evaluate if states with stricter regulations on lobbyists have more egalitarian patterns of political representation. Along with the strictness of state lobbying regulations, I also include in the model a measure of income inequality in a state, the degree of electoral competitiveness, and the composition of a state"s interest group community. A state"s level of income inequality is measured using the Gini coefficient for 1999 (data from the U.S. Census Bureau 15 ) and is included because previous research on unequal political influence at the state level suggests that political representation is the least egalitarian in states with higher levels of income inequality Wright 2011, 2013 Table S4 . Gini Ratios by State: 1969 State: , 1979 State: , 1989 State: , 1999 http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/ data/historical/state/state4.html. 16 Similarly, in a cross-national analysis, Giger, Rosset, and Bernauer (2012) find that political parties are especially unresponsive to the opinions of poor citizens in countries with higher levels of economic inequality.
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victory along with the presence of uncontested and "safe" seats. It is included in the model because previous research suggests that disadvantaged citizens receive more favorable policy representation when there is greater competition between candidates/parties for elected office in a state (Key 1949; Brace and Jewett 1995; Soss, Schram, Vartanian, and O'Brien 2001; Barrilleaux, Holbrook, and Langer 2002) . The composition of a state"s interest group environment is measured as the percentage of organized groups in 1997 that represent for-profit interests (measure devised by Gray and Lowery 1996 , updated for 1997 by Gray, Lowery, Fellowes, and McAtee 2004 and is included because previous research indicates that a greater proportion of for-profit groups attenuates the link between public opinion and state policy outputs (Gray, Lowery, Fellowes, and McAtee 2004) .
Column 1 of Table 4 reports the coefficient estimates from regressing the Political Equality Index on the independent variables described above. The coefficient for strictness of lobbying regulations is positive and statistically different from zero, indicating that lobbying regulations are an important predictor of political equality. Specifically, states with stricter regulations on lobbyists tend to weigh citizens" opinions more equally in the policymaking process. In addition, the other covariates in the model behave as expected: states with more competitive elections tend to be more politically equal whereas states with higher levels of income inequality and a greater proportion of for-profit interest groups tend to be less politically equal.
[ Table 4 about here]
Substantively, the effect of lobbying regulations is quite large. Column 2 of Table 4 reports the substantive effect in terms of standard deviations of the Political Equality Index when moving from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above for each of the independent variables in the model. As illustrated in the table, lobbying regulations have the largest substantive effect on the equality of political representation: moving one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above corresponds to a .60 standard deviation increase in the Political Equality Index. In summary, the data indicate that the strictness of lobbying regulations is an important predictor of representational equality in the American states.
With "only" 48 cases in the analysis, it is possible that one or two data points may exert undue influence on the regression coefficients and obscure the actual relationship between lobbying regulations and political equality. To investigate this possibility and to ensure the robustness of the findings discussed above, I use the same model specification and instead run a bi-weight robust regression. The results of this additional estimation are reported in Column 3 of Table 4 and reveal that the coefficient for lobbying regulations remains positive and statistically different from zero. Using an alternative estimation technique, the result is the same: states with stricter lobbying regulations display more egalitarian patterns of political representation.
Conclusion
Congruence between citizens" opinions and public policy outputs is the "bottom line" for American democracy. A well established political science literature demonstrates that citizens" aggregated opinions generally predict the ideological tone of public policy in both state (e.g., Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993) and national politics (e.g., Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002) . However, far less attention has been devoted to the question: Are citizens" opinions represented equally? Recent studies at the national level (Bartels 2008; Gilens 2012; Ellis 2013) report that the opinions of disadvantaged citizens are especially underrepresented in the policymaking process compared to the affluent across a wide array of policy domains. This paper extends this new line of inquiry to the American states and uncovers similar findings (also see Gilens, Lax, and Phillips 2011; Wright 2011, 2013; Flavin 2012) . Assessing the relationship between citizens" general political ideology and state policy liberalism, citizens with higher incomes are better represented compared to citizens with lower incomes (see Table 2 ). If "a key characteristic of a democracy is the continued responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals" (Dahl 1971, 1) , the democratic process in the American states appears to fall short of this standard.
The analysis also reveals that there is significant variation in the equality of political representation across the states (see Table 3 ). Taking advantage of this variation and differences in laws that regulate lobbying across the states, I find evidence that states with stricter lobbying regulations have more egalitarian patterns of political representation (see Table 4 ). As discussed above, scholars and the general public have voiced increasing concern about the political influence exerted by organized interests, and one hypothesized way to attenuate this influence is to impose regulations on the registration and conduct of professional lobbyists. The results presented in this paper indicate that, net of other factors we would expect to predict political equality, states that implement more comprehensive lobbying regulations tend to weigh citizens" political opinions more equally in government policy decisions.
Looking ahead, future studies that examine the potential consequences of lobbying regulations should investigate their effect on other outcomes associated with the quality of democracy. For example, several states implemented more stringent lobbying regulation laws in the 1990s in response to high profile political scandals among government officials. Have these new regulations been successful at preventing further instances of political corruption?
Moreover, the analysis presented in this paper measures strictness as the number of different regulations a state has on its books (Newmark 2005 Dependent variable for Columns 1 and 3 is the Political Equality Index (higher value indicates a more equal weighting of citizens" political opinions). Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients for Column 1 and bi-weight robust regression coefficients for Column 3, with standard errors reported beneath in brackets. * denotes p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 using a two-tailed test. Column 2 reports the substantive effect in terms of standard deviations of the Political Equality Index when moving from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above for the indicated independent variable (computed from the coefficients in Column 1).
Figure 1: Computing Ideological Distance Between Opinion and Policy
Using a proximity measure of political representation, Citizen A is better represented than Citizen B because the ideological distance between her opinion and state policy is smaller. 
